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ABSTRACT 
 
 The unconditional expectation of social welfare is often used to 
assess alternative macroeconomic policy rules in applied quantitative 
research. It is shown that it is generally possible to derive a linear -
quadratic problem that approximates the exact non-linear problem 
where the unconditional expectation of the objective is maximised and 
the steady-state is distorted. Thus, the measure of policy 
performance is a l inear combination of second moments of 
economic variables which is relatively easy to compute numerically, and 
can be used to rank alternative policy rules. The approach is applied to 
a simple Calvo-type model under various monetary policy rules.  
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1. Introduction
Taylor (1979) suggests that, in quantitative theoretical investigations under
rational expectations, macroeconomic stabilization policies ought to optimize
the unconditional expectation of the policymaker’s objective function. That
perspective on policy assessment has proven popular; some prominent examples
include Whiteman (1986), Rotemberg and Woodford (1998), Woodford (1999),
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000), Kollman
(2002), Kim and Henderson (2005) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007).
The ordering of policies has conventionally been done by comparing losses
calculated as a linear combination of the volatilities of output and in‡ation
gaps. That criterion can be justi…ed as a second-order approximation of the
unconditional welfare of a representative agent around a non-distorted steady state.
As is well known, the non-distorted steady state is the allocation which maximizes
utility in an economy in the absence of constraints. To justify use of the non-
distorted steady state as the approximation ‘point’, it is necessary to assume that
lump-sum taxation is available.
However, in the more interesting case when the steady-state is distorted, it is
not known whether the loss function can be expressed as a linear combination
of quadratic terms. This paper devises a tractable LQ formulation to the
unconditionally optimal (UO) policy problem when the steady-state is distorted.
An advantage from doing this includes, as Benigno and Woodford (2007) note, the
possibility of ranking alternative policies1.
To design our algorithm we extend the methodology of Damjanovic,
Damjanovic and Nolan (DDN) (2008), which derives the …rst-order necessary
conditions for the policy optimizing the unconditional expectation of welfare2.
Then, similar to Judd (1999) and Benigno and Woodford (2007), the linear-
quadratic approximation is done around the optimal deterministic steady state;
1See also Kim and Kim (2007).
2See also Blake (2001) and Jensen and McCallum (2002, 2010) and Whiteman (1986).
2
in our case around the unconditionally optimal steady-state and in Benigno and
Woodford’s case, the timeless-perspective (TP) steady-state.3 In contrast to the
timeless perspective, unconditional optimisation incorporates the e¤ect of policy
on the distribution of initial conditions. However, we show that accounting for
these initial conditions does not preclude the possibility of LQ approximation.
The paper highlights important di¤erences between UO and TP policies when
the steady-state is distorted. Jensen and McCallum (2010) compare UO policies
(what they call "optimal continuation" policies) with the TP, when the steady-
state is e¢cient. In that case, it is shown that the form of the welfare function to
be optimized is the same across policies. Here we show that the corresponding LQ
problems can be signi…cantly di¤erent when the steady-state is distorted. We …nd
that UO and TP approaches imply di¤erent steady states, di¤erent arguments in
the social welfare function and di¤erent dynamic constraints. Even the number of
dynamic constraint may di¤er across the TP and UO policy problems.
Finally, we also develop a useful approach for constructing the unconditional
welfare measure. Since this measure can be presented in the form of a linear
combination of the second moments, one can apply the Anderson, McGrattan,
Hansen and Sargent (1996) algorithm which has good convergence properties.
Consequently, it is also straightforward numerically to analyze UO policies.
A speci…c application of the approach is provided employing the canonical
New Keynesian model. A number of insights emerge. First, unconditionally
optimal monetary policy is characterized by trend in‡ation. That trend in in‡ation
complicates the linear-quadrati…cation4. That explains a second insight: The
second-order approximate loss function is no longer de…ned solely over terms in
output and in‡ation as found in DDN for the non-distorted steady-state case.
However, the loss function that one obtains is easily interpreted in light of the
underlying distortions in the economy. The approximate loss function is used to
evaluate and rank di¤erent simple rules for monetary policy (i.e., the nominal
3See also Debortoli and Nunes (2006) and Levine, Pearlman and Pierse (2008).
4As shown in Ascari and Ropele (2008) and Damjanovic and Nolan (2010).
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interest rate). The welfare implications of nominal income targeting versus
in‡ation targeting are explored and our results are contrasted with some of those
of Kim and Henderson (2005).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the basic problem
is set out in a general form. The problem is analyzed and it is shown that one
can derive a purely quadratic approximation to the unconditional expectation of
the objective function. Section 3 begins the application; …rst a canonical New
Keynesian, Calvo-price-setting model is set up. Section 4 formalizes the policy
problem and demonstrates the application of the various steps in the approach of
section 2. There is then a brief discussion of the implications for optimal monetary
policy when the steady state is distorted and the authorities are optimizing over
the unconditional loss function. In Section 5 we use the unconditional welfare
criterion to explore brie‡y the impact of di¤erent simple rules for monetary policy.
Section 6 o¤ers some conclusions. Appendices contain proofs and details of key
derivations.
2. The general problem
Consider a discounted loss function of the form
 = (1¡ )
1X
=0
(+) (2.1)
where  is the expectations operator conditional on information up through date
,  is the time discount factor, (+) is the period loss function and  is a
vector of target variables. Speci…cally,  = [  ]  where  is a vector of
predetermined endogenous variables (lags of variables that are included in  and
),  is a vector of non-predetermined endogenous variables (including ‘jump’
variables), the value of which will generally depend upon both policy actions and
exogenous disturbances at date , and  is a vector of policy instruments, the value
of which is chosen in period . Let  denote a vector of exogenous disturbances.
For simplicity, assume that  is a function of primary i.i.d. shocks, ()

¡1 
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Further, let the evolution of the endogenous variables  and  be determined
by a system of simultaneous equations,
 (+1 ) = 0 (2.2)
Let us further assume, following Taylor (1979), that the policy maker seeks to
minimize the unconditional expectation of the loss function (2.1), subject to
constraints, (2.2)5. That is, he or she searches for a policy rule
 (+1 ) = 0 (2.3)
such that
 = argmin() (2.4)
where  is the unconditional expectations operator. We call such a policy
"unconditionally optimal" and denote it ‘UO-policy’.
2.1. Solution
The …rst step is to formulate the non-linear policy problem and identify the non-
stochastic steady state around which approximation needs to take place. Next, the
possibility of a second-order approximation to welfare is addressed; speci…cally the
possibility of a loss function that is solely a function of quadratic terms. However,
an alternative approach to analyzing (2.2)-(2.4) is to solve a non-linear problem
and to analyze the linearized optimality conditions. So, …nally in this section we
establish the equivalence of the LQ approach (which is the central topic of this
paper) with that alternative approach of "optimize then linearize".
5Taylor’s approach may be interpreted as a recommendation: Policymakers ought to seek to
minimize the unconditional value of the loss function. This appears partly, perhaps largely, in
response to the issue of time inconsistency. See Taylor (1979) for further discussion. McCallum
(2005) is an interesting discussion of these, and related, issues.
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2.1.1. Necessary conditions for an optimum
Consider the following Lagrangian function which derives from the above optimal
policy problem:
L ( ) =  ( () +  ( ) +  (+1 ¡ ))  (2.5)
DDN (2008) show that the necessary conditions for the optimality of policy, , is
that it implies a path for the endogenous variables,  and  and that there exists
Lagrange multipliers, ( )  that together satisfy the …rst-order conditions (2.6),
(2.7) and constraints (2.2)6,


=
 ()

+ 
 ( )

+ ¡1 = 0; (2.6)


= 
 ( )

¡  = 0 (2.7)
where  ( ) is the Hamiltonian for (2.5), such that L ( ) =
 ( ( )) 
Judd (1999), Woodford (2002) and Benigno and Woodford (2005) demonstrate
very clearly that the choice of the steady-state is crucial (along with the
solution concept for forward-looking policy problems) in being able to obtain LQ
approximations to general non-linear, forward-looking policy problems. To choose
the deterministic steady state around which log-linearization takes place, one needs
to solve the system of …rst-order conditions (2.6), (2.7) and constraints (2.2). The
steady state ( ) is de…ned by the system (2.8-2.9):
 ( ) = 0; (2.8)
 ()

+ 
 ()

+ 
 ( )

= 0 (2.9)
where ,  and  indicate the vectors of steady state values of endogenous
variables, Lagrange multipliers and the average value of shocks, respectively. We
refer to ( ) as the "unconditionally optimal steady state"7.
6The notation  is a shorthand for the tensor product,
P
=1 
7It is assumed throughout that system (2.8) has a unique solution.
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In the absence of shocks, solution (2.8) shows that unconditionally optimal
policy delivers the steady state with the highest level of steady state welfare. This
is not the case for "timeless perspective"-optimal policy. It is worth emphasizing
that the TP approach discussed in Woodford (2002) implies di¤erent …rst-order
conditions and therefore a di¤erent center of approximation. That di¤erence will
be shown to lead to a di¤erent optimal monetary policy.8
2.2. The possibility of pure second-order approximation
The value of the loss function  () should not change if combined with the
unconditional expectation of the constraints  (  ). Thus, the appendix
demonstrates that the second-order approximation to this combination has a pure
second-order form. That is,
 ( ) =  [ () +  (  )]
=  +  +  +3 (2.10)
The notation 3 denotes third or higher-order terms.  and  are pure second-
order terms of the log-approximation, around the unconditionally optimal steady
state, to the loss function  () and dynamic constraints  (+1  ) :
 =
1
2
µ
2
2
2
bb¶ ;
 =
1
2
2
µ
2
2
+
2
2
¶ bb
+
2

bb+1 + 2

bb + 2b+1b
where we use b to denote a log deviation from steady state.
It is straightforward to show that the maximization of the unconditional
objective (2.10) subject to the linearized analogues of equations (2.2) yields
the same solution as log-linearization of the …rst-order conditions (2.6). This
latter approach is proposed by Khan, King and Wolman (2004) in the context
8Speci…cally, in the TP methodology, equation (2.6) is replaced by () + 
 ()
 +
¡1¡1 = 0 and therefore (2.9) becomes
()

+   () + 
¡1  () = 0
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of conditional optimization, and is extended in DDN (2008) to unconditional
optimization. See Appendix 7.2 for a con…rmation of our assertion.
2.3. Substitution techniques for UO and TP policies
Although the method of pure second-order approximation, (2.10), is
straightforward and quite e¢cient, it may be useful to show how one can replicate
the same welfare analysis by substituting variables employing the dynamic
constraints, (2.2). In particular, it demonstrates that even though UO policy
cannot ignore initial conditions, that does not prevent one from using a substitution
approach for UO policy analysis. Consider a second-order approximation to the
dynamic constraint equations,
b+1 = b + b + +2 (2.11)
where  is a pure quadratic form.
The TP methodology expresses the discounted sum of fb+g+1=0 as a function
of fb+g+1=0  In that case, equation (2.11) is integrated forward to yield
+1X
=0
b+1+ = +1X
=0
b+ + +1X
=0
b+ + +1X
=0
+ +2
That expression can be simpli…ed as
¡
¡1 ¡ ¢ +1X
=0
b+ ¡ ¡1b = +1X
=0
b+ + +1X
=0
+ +2
Then an initial value, b is ignored as a "term independent of policy" and the
…nal expression appears as
+1X
=0
b+ = 1
¡1 ¡ 
+1X
=0
b+ + 1
¡1 ¡ 
+1X
=0
+ +2
This expression is then used to calculate approximate utility.
To deriver the analogous expression in the case of UO policy one applies the
unconditional expectations operator to (2.11)
b+1 = b +b + +2 (2.12)
Then, one uses the fact that b+1 = b, which transforms (2.12) into
b = 1
1 ¡ b + 11 ¡  +2 (2.13)
which is the desired expression.
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3. Example: Calvo model with distorted steady state
A more or less canonical dynamic New Keynesian model is now developed and
two issues in particular are pursued. First, which model variables appear in the
approximate loss function? Second, some insight is sought into the nature of
optimal monetary policy.
3.1. The Households
There is a large number of identical agents in this (closed) economy where the only
input to production is labour. Each agent evaluates utility using the following
criterion:
0
1X
=0
( ()) = 0
1X
=0

Ã
log()¡ 
1 + 
µZ

()
¶1+!
 (3.1)
 denotes the conditional expectations operator at time  ¸ 0,  is the discount
factor,  is consumption and () is the quantity of labour supplied to industry
; labour is industry speci…c.  ¸ 0 measures the labour supply elasticity while 
is a ‘preference’ parameter.
Consumption is de…ned over a Dixit-Stiglitz basket of goods
 =
·Z 1
0
()
¡1
 
¸ 
¡1
 (3.2)
The average price-level, , is known to be
 =
·Z 1
0
()
1¡
¸ 1
1¡
 (3.3)
The demand for each good is given by
() =
µ
()

¶¡
   (3.4)
where () is the nominal price of the …nal good produced in industry  and  
denotes aggregate demand.
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Agents face the ‡ow constraint
 + = [1 + ¡1]¡1 +(1¡ ) + ¦ (3.5)
As all agents are identical, the only …nancial assets traded in equilibrium will
be those issued by the …scal authority. Here  denotes the nominal value of
government bond holdings, at the end of date  1+  is the nominal interest rate
on this ‘riskless’ one-period nominal asset,  is the nominal wage in period  (our
assumptions mean that we do not need to index wages on ), and ¦ indicates any
pro…ts remitted to the individual. It is assumed that labour income is taxed at
rate  . The usual conditions are assumed to apply to the consumer’s limiting net
savings behavior. Hence, necessary conditions for an optimum include:
¡
0
( )
 0 ( )
=    =  (1¡ ) ; (3.6)
 =

1¡  

 ; (3.7)
and

½
 0 (+1 +1)
 0 ( )

+1
¾
=
1
1 + 
 (3.8)
Here  denotes the real wage. The complete markets assumption implies the
existence of a unique stochastic discount factor,
+ = 

++
 (3.9)
where
 f+g = 
Y
=0
1
1 + +

3.2. Representative …rm: factor demand
As noted, labour is the only factor of production. Firms are monopolistic
competitors who produce their distinctive goods according to the following
technology
() =  [()]
1  (3.10)
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where () denotes the amount of labour hired by …rm  in period ,  is a
stochastic productivity shock and 1  .
The demand for output determines the demand for labour. Hence one …nds
that
() =
µ
()

¶¡ µ 

¶
 (3.11)
There is an economy-wide labour market so that all …rms pay the same wage for
the same labour. As a result, as asserted above, one may write () =  8
All households provide the same share of labour to all …rms. The total amount of
labour will then be
 =
Z
() =
µ


¶ Z µ
()

¶¡
 =
¡
¡1 
¢
¢ (3.12)
where ¢ is the measure of price dispersion:
¢ ´
Z 1
0
µ
()

¶¡
 (3.13)
3.3. Representative …rm: price setting
As in Calvo (1983), each period a …xed proportion of …rms are allowed to adjust
prices. Those …rms choose the nominal price which maximizes their expected pro…t
given that they have to charge the same price in  periods time with probability
. As usual, we assume that …rms are cost-takers. Let 0() denote the choice of
nominal price by a …rm that is permitted to re-price in period  As all …rms who
are permitted to reprice will choose the same price, optimal repricing implies
µ
0

¶1+(¡1)
=
³

¡1
´P1
=0()
 ¡1+
h
++
¡
+

+(+)
¡
i
P1
=0()
(+)1¡
 (3.14)
where  is a cost-push shock. The price index then evolves according to the law
of motion,
 =
£
(1 ¡ ) 01¡ +  1¡¡1
¤1(1¡)
 (3.15)
Because the relative prices of the …rms that do not change their prices in period 
fall by the rate of in‡ation, the law of motion for the measure of price dispersion
is
¢ = ¢¡1

 + (1 ¡ ) (0)¡  (3.16)
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4. UO Monetary Policy
Proposition 4.1 sets out the relevant UO Ramsey problem.
Proposition 4.1. The UO Ramsey plan is a choice of state contingent paths for
the endogenous variables f+¢+ + ++ +g1=0 from date  onwards
given
©
+ +
ª1
=0
, so as to maximize social welfare function (4.1) subject
to constraints (4.2)-(4.4):
max
1X
=0

µ
log+
(1 + )
¡ 1

log ¢+ ¡ +
¶
; (4.1)
subject to:
² The Phillips block
¡+1  = ; (4.2)
 = 1 + +1
¡1
+1 ;
 =
(1 + )
©
µ



¢
¶
+ +1

+1
² The law of motion of prices
¢ = ¢¡1

 + (1 ¡ ) ¡  (4.3)
² Prices:  is the relative price set by …rms updating at time 
 =
Ã
1 ¡ ¡1
1 ¡ 
! 1
1¡
 (4.4)
It is useful in formalizing this policy problem to de…ne some variables as follows:
Discounted marginal revenue is  := 
P1
=0 ()

³

+
´1¡
; discounted
marginal cost is  := 
P1
=0 ()
 +

(1+)
©
+
¢
³

+
´¡
; period marginal
cost is + := 1+¢
+1
+
¡
¡1++
¢(+1)
; and © := ¡1

1¡

 1, indexes the steady
state distortions in this economy.
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One can set up the Hamiltonian for this problem, as proposed in section 2, as
follows:
 =
µ
1
( + 1)
log ¡ 1

log ¢ ¡ 
¶
+
¡
 ¡ 1 ¡ ¡1+1+1
¢
+
µ
 ¡ 

(1 + )
©

¢
¡ +1+1
¶
+
³
 ¡ ¡+1 
´
+
³
¢ ¡ ¢¡1 ¡ (1 ¡ ) ¡
´
+
0@ ¡ Ã1 ¡ ¡1
1 ¡ 
! 1
1¡
1A 
The necessary conditions for an optimum include:



 =
1
( + 1)
¡  ¡ 


(1 + )
©

¢
;

¢
 =
µ
¡ 1
¢
¶
+ 
µ


(1 + )
©

¢2
¶
+  ¡+1+1;


 =  ¡ ¡1¡1 ¡ ¡+1 ;


 =  ¡ ¡1 + ;



 = ¡ ( ¡ 1) ¡1¡1  ¡ ¡1  (4.5)
¡¢¡1 ¡ 
¡1
1 ¡  ;



 = ¡ (¡  + 1)1¡+ +  (1 ¡ ) ¡ + 
To reduce a little on notation, denote
 :=
µ


(1 + )
©

¢
¶
 (4.6)
which represents marginal production costs.
4.1. The steady state
As noted, unconditionally optimal policy is associated with the highest level of
steady-state welfare, unlike TP optimal policy. It is well known (see Benigno and
Woodford, 2005) that TP optimal policy requires price stability in the steady state.
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On the other hand, King and Wolman (1999) argue that a slightly positive in‡ation
rate maximises steady-state welfare. We now turn in more detail to steady-state
analysis.
The value of the endogenous variables in steady state should solve the system
of constraints (4.2), (4.3), (4.4), (4.6) and the …rst-order conditions, (4.5). As a
result one obtains the following steady state equations:
 =
³
1¡¡1
1¡
´ 1
1¡
;  ( + 1) = 1¡©¢;
¢ =
³
1¡
1¡
´
¡; ¢
¡
1¡ ¢ = ³ 1

¡ 
´
;
 = 1
1¡¡1 ;  = ¡
¡
1¡ ¢ ;
 = ¡+1;  = ¡+1 = ¡ ¡1¡ ¢¡+1;
 =
¡
1¡ ¢;  = (¡  + 1) ¡  (1¡ ) ¡
 = © ¢
(1+)
;
(4.7)
Using these equations, one can derive the following expression
( ¡ 1) ¡1 +  + ¢ + 
¡1
1¡  = 0 (4.8)
which can be used to infer certain properties of the optimal steady-state in‡ation
rate.
Proposition 4.2. The steady state in‡ation is positive,  ¸ 1 Price stability is
only optimal if either  = 1 or if © = 1 (which corresponds to the non-distorted
steady state). Moreover  is unique and bounded:  · min(1(¡1¡) ¡1())
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 4.3. Steady state in‡ation increases with the distortion, 1¡© and
declines in the discount factor  and the labour elasticity, .
Proof. See Appendix.
Using parameter values typically found in the literature, expression (4.8)
implies that optimal steady state in‡ation is of the order of 0.2% a year. As
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discussed in King and Wolman (1999), this small positive trend in in‡ation re‡ects
a number of con‡icting e¤ects. On the one hand, a small amount of in‡ation
can boost demand, as it partially o¤sets the markup distortion. On the other
hand, price dispersion, which is rising in in‡ation, acts rather like a cost shock on
…rms, for reasons analyzed in Damjanovic and Nolan (2010). Hence, one …nds that
optimal trend in‡ation has a U-shaped relation to price stickiness, ; it is increasing
in  when initial price dispersion is relatively small, and declines once initial price
dispersion is su¢ciently large. Optimal in‡ation declines in the discount factor,
. As discussed in more detail in DDN (2008) and demonstrated in section 2.3,
UO policy in contrast to timeless perspective policy, gives some weight to the
distribution of initial conditions. In particular, it considers the distribution of the
initial output gap. That is partly why some stimulation of output via in‡ation
is desirable. So the smaller the discount factor, the higher is the relative weight
on initial conditions and the higher the optimal in‡ation rate. Finally, we note
that the nominal interest rate is positive in the UO steady state. That conclusion
follows from the Euler equation (3.8) which yields 1(1 + ) =   1.
4.2. The quadratic form
Having recovered the optimal steady state, one can obtain a quadratic loss
function; that is, an equation of the form (2.10):
 =  +  +  +  + ¢ + 
where
 = ¡1
2
b2 ;
 =
1
2

³ b2 ´ ¡ 1¡1 12 b2 = ¡12 1¡1 b2 ;
 =
1
2
 b2 ¡ 12b2 ¡ 12 ³b+1 + b+1´2 ;
 =
1
2
 b2 ¡  12 ³(¡  + 1) b + b´2 = 0;
¢ =
1
2
¢b¢2 ¡ (1 ¡ )  12 (b)2 ¡ 12¢ ³b¢¡1 + b´2 ;
 =
1
2
b2 ¡ 12 ¡11 ¡ ¡1
µ

¡1
1 ¡ ¡1 ¡ 1
¶ b2
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The details of the derivation are set out in the appendix. One can simplify the
above expression in a number of ways. Consider the following expression:9
 = ¡1
2

h
b2 + b2 + ¤ b2 + ¤¢ b¢2 + ¤ b2i  (4.9)
It is possible to write equation (4.9) in a way that relates it more clearly to the
‘standard’ loss function often employed which is simply de…ned over output and
in‡ation. First, recall the de…nitions of b :
b = ( + 1) b¢ + ( + 1)³b ¡ b´ 
Now note that b can be represented as
b = b ¡ 
b can be thought of as the ‘labour wedge’ of ine¢ciency (note the role price
dispersion):
 :=





=


=
µ


©
(1 + )
¢
¶

which in log-linearized form is simply:
b=b¢¡b
So one can further simplify (4.9) to
= ¡1
2

·
 (1 + )
³b ¡ b ¤ ´2 +b2 + ¤ b2 + ¤¢ b¢2 + ¤ b2¸  (4.10)
The term b ¤ represents the ‘target’ level of output  ¤ = b¡b¡¢ b¢ (and where
details concerning coe¢cients are again given in the Appendix). The ‘target’ rate is
increasing in productivity and declining in the cost-push shock; it is also declining
in price dispersion. The variable b represents, in e¤ect, the losses to the …rm
forced to charge suboptimal prices due to price stickiness and expected in‡ation,
to which they may not be able to react.
This form of the loss function can easily be nested to familiar cases, either the
non-distorted steady state where © = 1 or where the steady state of the model
economy remains distorted but where the social discount rate is equal to the private
9The coe¢cients of equation (4.9) are positive for reasonable parameterizations.
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rate of discount,  = 1 (in which case the UO policy and the timeless perspective
policies coincide). In both special cases optimal monetary policy corresponds to
price stability and the loss function (4.10) reduces to a familiar form de…ned simply
over in‡ation and output. Speci…cally, if the optimal steady state is characterized
by price stability, then ¤ = 0 Moreover one can easily show that price dispersion,b¢, is a second-order term in that case. Lastly, the labour wedge b is then simply
a cost-push shock, b and can be considered as a term independent of policy.
5. Application: Unconditional ordering of simple rules
The foregoing approach is easily used to evaluate simple rules for monetary policy
and to highlight the potential signi…cance for policy design of a distorted steady-
state. First, write the model in vector autoregressive form as follows:
b ¡ ¡1
1 ¡ ¡1 b = 0 (5.1)
b+1 +b+1 = b + (1 ¡ )b (5.2)

³ b+1 + b+1´ = b ¡ 

b (5.3)
¡1
³ b+1 + ( ¡ 1) b+1´ = b (5.4)
b ¡ µ(¡  + 1) ¡1
1 ¡ ¡1 b + b
¶
= 0 (5.5)
¡ ¤ + b ¡ b ¡ µ+ ( + 1)
¶ b¢ = 0 (5.6)
¡b+b¢¡b = 0 (5.7)
¡b + b ¡ b = 0 (5.8)
¡b + ( + 1) b¢ + ( + 1)(b ¡ b) = 0 (5.9)b¢+1 ¡ b+1 + (1 ¡ ) ¡
¢
b+1 =  b¢ (5.10)
¡b = b +  b + (5.11)
More compactly, one writes
+1 =  ++1
where  is the vector of endogenous variables and +1 is the vector of exogenous
shocks. In this form it is straightforward to construct the variance-covariance
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matrix,  ´  0 , using standard software such as Dynare. That is,  is
recovered by solving the following matrix equation
 = 0 +¨0 (5.12)
where ¨ = 0 is the unconditional variance-covariance matrix of the underlying
shock processes. Equation (5.12) can be solved numerically using a doubling
algorithm as described in Anderson, McGrattan, Hansen, and Sargent (1996) using
an equivalent form
 =
+1X
=0
¨00 
As demonstrated in section 2.2, the social welfare function is then a linear
combination of the elements of matrix 
In the above linearized system of equations the …nal equation (5.11) is the
policy rule, whereb is the gross nominal interest rate, b = log ¡ (1 + )¢  and b
represents a linear combination of policy feedback variables, while  is a policy
shock.10
It is clear that steady-state distortions complicate the policy problem so far as
the policymaker’s objective function is concerned11. However, does it make any
di¤erence so far as the design of simple rules are concerned?12.
First, a simple interest rate feedback rule is considered, where the interest rate
responds to current and lagged in‡ation only. The feedback on current in‡ation is
…xed at  = 15 Given this, the optimized weight on lagged in‡ation,  = b¡1,
is computed. In both the distorted and non-distorted case the optimal feedback
is about 15 in the distorted case and 14 in the non-distorted steady state case.
10The following parameterization is used in the quantitative investigation:  = 09  = 11
 = 7  = 05 and  = 13 It is assumed that shocks, ,  and  follow (1) processes
with:  = 098  = 0008  = 09  = 0005 and  = 09  = 002
11That is, complicates it relative to the objective function in the non-distorted case.
12In the particular model developed above, the UO trend in‡ation is rather small and the policy
ordering across distorted and non-distorted steady states is often the same for given simple rules.
However, in simulations not reported, it was possible to …nd simple, plausible rules that result
in welfare "reversals"; that is, where rule 1 welfare dominates rule 2 in the distorted economy,
but where the ranking switched in the non-distorted economy.
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However, the di¤erence in welfare between responding and not responding to
lagged in‡ation is quite substantial and may be up to 16 percentage points in terms
of consumption equivalent units (see the top right hand graph in the panel below,
 is at its optimal value)). As in the TP approach, relative price distortion is very
costly and the optimal simple rule may be very close to price stability ( = +1)
However, if for any reason the policy reaction on current in‡ation is restricted, the
economy may signi…cantly bene…t from a response to lagged in‡ation.
One can also show that the optimal feedback on output should be slightly
negative,  = ¡0015 Furthermore, inclusion of real output targeting leads to
very modest welfare improvements, in the order of 10¡3 compared with targeting
in‡ation alone. This result is consistent with Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) who
found that a positive feedback on real output did not increase welfare.
The results are summed up in Figure 1 (where the broken line is the non-
distorted economy).
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Figure 1: Suboptimal simple policies
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5.0.1. Targeting Nominal Income Growth
Finally, in‡ation targeting and nominal income targeting are compared under an
UO policy criterion as in Kim and Henderson (2005). Kim and Henderson suggest,
in a model with one-period price stickiness, that nominal income targeting may
have superior welfare properties to in‡ation targeting. Two rules are compared:
Nominal income growth targeting:  = 005 ( ¡ ¡1 + ) (5.13)
+( ¡ 005)  +;
In‡ation targeting:  =  + (5.14)
In the case of a non-distorted steady state, and a "low" feedback on in‡ation
the …ndings are similar to some of Kim and Henderson’s …ndings. Speci…cally,
in the case of a distorted steady-state model, the net welfare gain from targeting
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nominal income growth over in‡ation targeting is positive. In the distorted case,
in‡ation targeting is rarely dominated by nominal income targeting. In Figure
2 below, the relative welfare gain (over in‡ation targeting) in targeting nominal
income growth is plotted against 
Figure 2: Relative welfare gain in targeting nominal income growth.
The precise position of these net welfare schedules is quite sensitive to
parameterization of the model (in particular, the persistence of shocks) but in
general one …nds that as the feedback on in‡ation rises, in‡ation targeting is likely
to dominate nominal income targeting.
6. Conclusion
The paper demonstrates that, in general, one is able to obtain a purely quadratic
approximate unconditional loss function to a model economy with a distorted
steady state. It develops a straightforward, e¢cient approach to implementing
the UO algorithm. In an application, it is shown that the loss function may be
somewhat more complex than in a model with no steady-state distortions; in‡ation
and output are no longer the sole arguments in the loss function. However, the
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loss function so obtained is easily interpreted in terms of the underlying distortions
in the economy. Furthermore, optimal in‡ation and nominal interest rates are
positive in the steady state. The implications for the ordering of simple rules is
brie‡y explored.
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7. Appendices
7.1. The possibility of the second-order approximation
The …rst part of the appendix demonstrates the key result in Section 2.2, namely
the existence of the quadratic form, (2.10). The …rst line of the following block
of equations corresponds to the top line of (2.10), the subsequent lines being its
quadratic approximation:
 () =  [ () +  (  )] =
= 
µ
 +


b + 1
2
µ
2
2
2
+


¶ bb¶
+
µ
 +


b +

b + 

b¶
+
1
2

µ



+2
2
2
¶
bb + 1
2

µ



+

2
¶
bb
+
1
2

µ



+ 2
2
2
¶
bb
+
µ



bb + 2

bb + bb
¶
+3
Using the constraints +1 = , and the property of unconditional expectations
that +1 = , this can be rewritten as
 () = b µ 

+ 


+ 


¶
+
1
2
bb µ 

+ 


+ 


¶
(7.1)
+ + 
+ +  + 


b + 12
µ



+ 2
2
2
¶
bb +3 (7.2)
Here  and  are pure second-order terms:
 =
1
2
2
2
2
bb;
 =
1
2
2
µ
2
2
+
2
2
¶ bb + 2

bb+1 + 2

bb + 2b+1b
Furthermore, using the steady state conditions (2.8), one can show that the
…rst line of expression (7.1) equals zero. Moreover, expression (7.2) consists of
 +  = , the steady state value of the loss function and shocks. These are
terms independent of policy () Thus, it is proved that the loss function can
be represented in a pure quadratic form.
 () =  +  + +3
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7.2. Alternative approaches to recovering UO policy
The approach of some researchers is to solve non-linear problems and then linearize
the resulting optimality conditions. For example, in the context of conditionally
optimal monetary policy, that is the approach taken by Khan, King and Wolman
(2003). This section demonstrates that this alternative approach also works in
the case of unconditionally optimal policy. Speci…cally, the maximization of the
unconditional objective (2.10) subject to the linearized analogues of equations (2.2)
yields the same solution as log-linearization of the …rst-order conditions (2.6). The
…rst-order conditions to the non-linear problem are written as


=
 ()

+ 
 ( )

+ ¡1 = 0;


= 
 ( )

¡ 
The log-linearized versions of these equations are:


=


+
2
2
b
+


+ 


b +  22 b +  2 b +  2b
++ b¡1 +2; (7.3)


= 


+ 


b +  22 b +  2 b +  2 b
¡¡ b +2 (7.4)
These are simpli…ed by plugging (7.4) into (7.3) and using the steady state
conditions (2.8),


= 
2
2
b



b +  22 b +  2 b +  2 b +  2b



b¡1 +  22 b¡1 +  2 b¡1 +  2 b¡1 = 0 (7.5)
Turning now to the LQ approach, utility is represented as (2.10). Hence, the
relevant optimization problem is
max (b) = max 1
2
2
2
2
bb + 1
2
2
µ
2
2
bb + 2
2
bb¶
+
2

bb +  2

bb +  2bb
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subject to log-linearized constraints
 (+1 ) = 


b +

b +  

b = 0; (7.6)b =  d+1 (7.7)
The new Hamiltonian can be written as
e = 1
2
2
2
2
bb + 1
2
2
µ
2
2
bb + 2
2
bb¶
+
2

bb +  2

bb +  2bb
+
µ



b +

b +  

b¶ + b ¡ ¡1b
where  and  are the corresponding Lagrange multipliers attached to linearized
constraints (7.6) and (7.7). The resulting …rst-order conditions are
 e
b = 2 22 b + 2 22 b
+
2

b +  2

b +   b ¡ b¡1
and
 e
b = 2 22 b +  2 b +  2b + b + b
So, it follows that one may write
1

 e
b =  22 b +  22 b
+
2

b +  2

b +  

2
2
b¡1 +  2

b¡1 +  2

b¡1 + b¡1  
This is identical to (7.5) with the following relations between Lagrange multipliers
 = b,  = b
7.3. Optimal steady state
7.3.1. Proof of Proposition 4.2: Existence
One may rewrite (4.8) as (7.8):
 () = () + [()¡ ()] + ©()() = 0 (7.8)
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where () = 1¡

1¡¡1
1¡¡1
1¡  0 and () =

1¡ ¡ 1¡¡1 ; () =h

1¡ ¡ 1¡
i
¡
h
¡1
1¡¡1 ¡ ¡11¡¡1
i
.
It is easy to see that (1) = 0; (1) = 1 and (1) = (¡+1)(1¡)
(1¡)(1¡)  0 which
implies that  (1) = ¡ (1¡ ©) (¡+1)(1¡)
(1¡)(1¡) · 0 The strict equality obtains in
three cases only. First, when prices are ‡exible,  = 0; second, when the future is
not discounted by …rms,  = 1; and …nally when there are no distortions in steady
state, © = 1
De…ne  = ¡1() and note that the functions   and  are de…ned on
an interval [1 ) The di¤erence [()¡ ()] is bounded while (), () and
() tends to positive in…nity as  approaches  Hence, lim
¡!
 () = +1. Since
 () is a continuous function, one can conclude that there is a solution to (7.8) on
the interval [1 ¡1()) One may easily show then that if  = 1(¡1¡) then
it follows that  ()  0 since () ¡ ()  0 Therefore, optimal in‡ation
is smaller than 
7.3.2. Proof of Proposition 4.2: Uniqueness
The proof is by contradiction. First it is proved that if   1 for any 1  
such that  (1) = 0 it is necessary that  0(1)  0 By direct di¤erentiation it
follows that
 0(1) = ( + 1) 0(1) + (©(1)¡ 1)  0(1) + ©0(1)(1)
Moreover, since  (1) = 0 it follows that (©(1)¡ 1) = ¡ ( + 1) (1)(1)
Therefore
 0(1) =
( + 1)
(1)
[0(1)(1)¡  0(1)(1)] + ©0(1)(1)
and it is easy to show that for any 1   0(1)(1) ¡  0(1)(1)  0 and
therefore,  0(1) is positive.
Since  is continuously di¤erentiable, if a solution of (7.8) is not unique, there
will be at least one solution such that  0(1) · 0 It has been demonstrated that
such a solution is impossible and the necessary contradiction is obtained.
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7.3.3. Proof of Proposition 4.3
By the implicit function theorem one concludes that 
©
= ¡


©
 From section
7.3.2, we know that 

 0 while 
©
= ()()  0 Therefore 
©
 0 and
equilibrium in‡ation increases with steady state distortions, measured as 1¡ ©.
Similarly 

= ¡



where 

= ()  0 for   1 therefore 

 0 and
optimal in‡ation declines with the elasticity of labour.
Moreover 

= ¡



 where 

= ¡ (1¡©()) 

+ ©()

 and one
may prove by direct di¤erentiation that 

 0  ln

 0 and (1¡©()) =
( + 1) ()()  0 Therefore 

 0 and 

 0
Finally, it is worth noting that steady state in‡ation can both increase or
decrease in price stickiness, since the sign of 

may be positive or negative.
7.4. A2: The second-order approximation to unconditional welfare.
In Section 4.2 of the main text we asserted the existence of the following quadratic
equation,
 =  ( +  +  +  + ¢ + ) 
where  is the second-order term of the loss function and       ¢ 
are the second-order terms of the log linear approximation to constraints (4.2)-
(4.4). This section demonstrates how one derives that equation. The model can
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be rewritten in the following linear-quadratic representation
(
1
( + 1)
log  ¡ 1

log ¢ ¡ ) ¡3
=
1
( + 1)
b ¡ 1

b¢ ¡ µb + 1
2
b2¶ + ;¡
 ¡ 1 ¡ ¡1+1+1
¢ ¡3
= 
µ b + 1
2
b2 ¶ ¡ ¡1 µ b+1 + ( ¡ 1) b+1 + 12 ³ b+1 + ( ¡ 1) b+1´2
¶
;³
 ¡  ¡ +1+1
´
¡3
= 
µ b + 1
2
b2 ¶ ¡ µb + 122
¶
¡ 
µ b+1 + b+1 + 1
2
³b+1 + b+1´2¶ ;³
 ¡ ¡+1 
´
¡3
= 
µ b + 1
2
b2 ¶ ¡ ¡+1 µ(¡  + 1) b + b + 12 ³(¡  + 1) b + b´2
¶
;
¢ ¡ ¢¡1 ¡ (1 ¡ ) ¡ ¡3
= ¢
µb¢ + 1
2
b¢2¶ ¡ ¢ µb¢¡1 + b + 12 ³b¢¡1 + b´2
¶
¡ (1 ¡ ) ¡
µ
¡b + 1
2
(b)2¶ ;
 ¡
Ã
1 ¡ ¡1
1 ¡ 
! 1
1¡
¡3;
= 
µb + 1
2
b2¶ ¡  ¡11 ¡ ¡1 b ¡ 12 ¡11 ¡ ¡1
µ

¡1
1 ¡ ¡1 ¡ 1
¶ b2
The linear relations are therefore,
b ¡ ¡1 ³ b+1 + ( ¡ 1) b+1´ = 2; (7.9)b ¡ 

b ¡  ³ b+1 + b+1´ = 2; (7.10)b ¡ ³(¡  + 1) b + b´ = 2; (7.11)
b¢ ¡  ³b¢¡1 + b´ + (1 ¡ ) ¡
¢
b = 2; (7.12)
b ¡ ¡1
1 ¡ ¡1 b = 2 (7.13)
31
and the following are the quadratic relations:
 = ¡1
2
b2 ;
 =
1
2

³ b2 ´ ¡ 1¡1 12 b2 = ¡12 1¡1 b2 ;
 =
1
2
 b2 ¡ 12b2 ¡ 12 ³b+1 + b+1´2 ; (7.14)
 =
1
2
 b2 ¡  12 ³(¡  + 1) b + b´2 = 0;
¢ =
1
2
¢b¢2 ¡ (1 ¡ ) ¡ 12 (b)2 ¡ 12¢ ³b¢¡1 + b´2; (7.15)
 =
1
2
b2 ¡ 12 ¡11 ¡ ¡1
µ

¡1
1 ¡ ¡1 ¡ 1
¶ b2 (7.16)
One can simplify these expressions as follows.
Simpli…cation of  : Use (7.13) in (7.16) to …nd that
 = ¡1
2
¦ b2
where we de…ne
¦ :=
µ
1 ¡ ¡1
1 ¡ 
¶ 1
1¡ ¡1
1 ¡ ¡1
µ
( ¡ 1)¡1
1 ¡ ¡1 ¡ 1
¶

Simpli…cation of  : Use (7.10) in (7.14),
2


= b2 ¡ ¡1 ¡ ¢b2 ¡  ³b + b´2 (7.17)
=
¡
1 ¡ ¢ b2 ¡ ¡1 ¡ ¢ b2 ¡  (b)³2 b + b´
=
³
(¡  + 1) b + b´³¡1 ¡ ¢ ³(¡  + 1) b + b´ ¡ 2 () b´
¡ ¡1 ¡ ¢b2 ¡  ()2 b2
= b2 ¡1 ¡ ¢ ¡ ¡1 ¡ ¢b2
¡ ()2 b2 + ¡1 ¡ ¢ (¡  + 1)2 b2 ¡ (¡  + 1) 2 () bb
2
Ã

¡
¡1 ¡ ¢ ¡ ( ¡ 1)¡1 ¡1 ¡ ¢
1 ¡ ¡1
! b b
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Furthermore, from (7.9) one can …nd an expression for 2b b
 b2 =  ¡¡1¢2 ³ b2+1 + 2 ( ¡ 1) b+1 b+1 + ( ¡ 1)2 b2+1´ 
which implies that
2 b b = 1
( ¡ 1)
Ã
1 ¡ ¡¡1¢2
(¡1)2
! b2 ¡ ( ¡ 1) b2  (7.18)
Now, combine (7.18) with (7.17) to yield
 = ¡ 1
2

h¡
1 ¡ ¢ b2 +  b2 +  b2 i 
where
 =
(¡  + 1) £ ¡ ¡ ¡1¡1¢ + ( ¡ 1)¡1 ¡1 ¡ ¢¤
(1 ¡ ¡1)2 ;
 =
1 ¡ 
1 ¡ ¡1
1 ¡ 2¡1
2¡1
+

 ¡ 1
1 ¡ ¡¡1¢2
(¡1)2
 ¡ ¡1
1 ¡ ¡1 
Simpli…cation of ¢ :
2
¢
¢ = b¢2 ¡ (1 ¡ ) ¡¢ (b)2 ¡  ³b¢¡1 + b´2 
One can simplify (7.15) using (7.12)

³b¢¡1 + b´2 = 1

µb¢ + (1 ¡ ) ¡
¢
¡1
1 ¡ ¡1 b
¶2
=
1

b¢2 + 1
Ã

¡
1 ¡ ¢¡1
1 ¡ ¡1
!2 b2
+2
1 ¡ 

¡1
1 ¡ ¡1
b¢ b
Next, using constraint (7.12), one …nds 2b¢ b
 b¢¡1 = b¢ + µ(1 ¡ ) ¡
¢
¡1
1 ¡ ¡1 ¡ 

¶ b
Recall that ¢ =
³
1¡
1¡
´
¡, so that
 b¢¡1 = b¢ + µ¡1 ¡ 
1 ¡ ¡1
¶ b +2
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This implies

³
 b¢¡1´2 =  b¢2 +µ¡1 ¡ 1 ¡ ¡1
¶2 b2 + 2µ¡1 ¡ 
1 ¡ ¡1
¶
 b b¢
One can simplify the …nal terms in the expression as follows
2

1 ¡ ¡1 b b¢ = (7.19)
¡ 1 ¡
¡

¢2
¡1 ¡ 
b¢2 ¡ 21 ¡ ¡1 ¡1 ¡ 1 ¡ ¡1  b2;
2
¢ (1 ¡ )¢ = ¡
1 ¡ ¡1
 ¡ ¡1
b¢2 ¡ · 1 ¡ ¡1
¸2 b2
Hence, using these simpli…cations, we return to the quadratic expression.
 =  ( +  +  +  + ¢ + ) ;
= ¡1
2
b2 ¡ 12 1¡1 b2 ¡ 12 h  b2 +  b2 +  b2 i
¡1
2
¢
¡
1 ¡ ¢(¡1 · 
1 ¡ ¡1
¸2 b2 + 1 ¡ ¡1
 ¡ ¡1
b¢2 )
¡1
2
¦ b2
= ¡1
2

³
b2 + b2 + ¤ b2 + ¤ b2 + ¤¢ b¢2´  (7.20)
where
¤ = 
µ
 ¡ 1 ¡ 

¡1
¶
;
¤ =  + ¢ + ¦;
¤¢ = ¢
¡
1 ¡ ¢ ¡1 ¡ ¡1¢
 ¡ ¡1  0
Further simpli…cation The log-linear expression of the marginal
disutility from labour  is
b = ( + 1) b¢ + ( + 1)³b ¡ b´ 
Marginal production costs are approximately written as
b = b ¡ b
where b is the labour wedge de…ned as
 :=





=


=


©
(1 + )
¢ (7.21)
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The …rst two terms in the quadratic loss function (7.20) can be simpli…ed as follows:
b2 + b2 = b2 +  (b ¡ b)2
= (+ ) b2 +  (b)2 ¡ 2bb
= (+ )
µb ¡ 
(+ )
b¶2 +  (1 ¡ (+ )) b2
=
1
( + 1)
µ
( + 1) b¢ + ( + 1)³b ¡ b´ ¡ 
+ 
³b¢ ¡ b´¶2
+
µ
1 ¡ 
( + 1)
¶b2 ;
= ( + 1)
µ
1

b¢ + b ¡ b ¡ ³b¢ ¡ b´¶2
+

( + 1)
(( + 1)¡ )b2 ;
= ( + 1)
µb ¡ µ b ¡ b ¡ µ ( + 1) + 
¶ b¢¶¶2
+

( + 1)
(( + 1)¡ )b2
= ( + 1)
³b ¡  ¤ ´2 +b2 
where we de…ne  ¤ and  as
 ¤ : = b ¡ b ¡ µ ( + 1) + 
¶ b¢;
 : =

( + 1)
(( + 1)¡ ) 
To obtain this result, recall that the steady state value of the Lagrange
multiplier  satis…es the following equation:
+  =
1
( + 1)
(1 ¡ ©¢) +  = 1
( + 1)

7.5. Linearized equations of the model
For completeness, details are provided of the linear approximate model, consisting
of the …rst-order conditions (4.5) and a system of constraints (4.2), (4.3), (4.4),
35
(4.6). The linearized block of equations is thus:



 = ¡b ¡  (b + b) ;
¢

¢
 = ¡ 1

b¢ + ³b + b ¡ b¢´ + ¢b ¡ ¢ ¡b+1 + b+1¢ ;


 = b ¡ ¡1 ¡b¡1 + ( ¡ 1) b¢ ¡ ¡+1 ³b + (¡  + 1) b´ ;


 = b ¡  ¡b¡1 + b¢ + b;



 = ¡ ( ¡ 1) ¡1
³b¡1 + ( ¡ 1) b + b´ ¡  ³b¡1 + b + b´ ;
¡¢
³b + b¢¡1 + b´ ¡ ¡11 ¡  ³b + b + ( ¡ 1) b´ ;



 = ¡ (¡  + 1)1¡+
³b + b + (1 ¡  + ) b´ ;
+¡ (1 ¡ ) (b ¡ b) + ³b + b´ ;
b ¡ ¡1 ³ b+1 + ( ¡ 1) b+1´ = 0;
 b ¡ b ¡  ³ b+1 + b+1´ = 0;b ¡ ³(¡  + 1) b + b´ = 0;
¢b¢ ¡ ¢ ³b¢¡1 + b´ + (1 ¡ ) ¡b = 0;
b ¡ ¡1
1 ¡ ¡1 b = 0;
¡b + b + b ¡ b¢ = 0
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